



FROM CHIPS TO SYSTEMS - LEARN TODAY, CREATE TOMORROW

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## Classifying Computations on Multi-Tenant FPGAs

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
## Overview

- FPGAs are powerful, but expensive -> virtualization
- Virtualization exposes a side-channel through shared power distribution
- Leverage this to determine aspects of co-located computation

Type of computation? Implementation?





### **Proposed Threat-Model**






## **Voltage Fluctuation Sensor**







## **Three-Stage Classification Pipeline**





## **Co-Located Applications**

- Baseline
- Power Wasters
- Cryptographic Cores (AES, PRESENT)
  - 1) Custom IP AES
  - 2) Orca
  - 3) PicoRV
  - 4) Microblaze



# 1 Pre-Process


2D Power Trace Containing 4 Samples	1D Popcount	
111111111111111111111111111111111000000	$\rightarrow$	36
000000000000000001111111111111111111111	$\rightarrow$	46
1111111111111111111111111111111111110000	$\rightarrow$	37
000000000000000001111111111111111111111	$\rightarrow$	46



# (2) Image Encoding: STFT

- Fourier transforms over windows of signal
- Produce an image that encodes the frequency domain of the signal at a given time
- Wish to encode aspects of co-tenant's computations

#### **Orca AES**





# **③** Classification: ResNet50


- Convolutional Neural Network
- Images  $\rightarrow$  Labels (baseline, power wasters, AES, PRESENT, Orca,...)
- Trained on labeled STFT images from the 9 classes
- Tested on reserved set of STFTs from the 9 classes



# **Classification Accuracy**

- 9-way classification accuracy
- Duration of sampling matters
- Longer segments  $\rightarrow$  Better Accuracy

ResNet50 9-Way Classification Accuracy





# Confusion

- Strong classification between
  base, AES, PW, Orca, PicoRV, MicroBlaze
- Misclassification between applications on single soft-processors

		base	aes	pw	orca-aes	orca-pres	mb-aes	mb-pres	pico-aes	pico-pres		
	base	0.96	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	aes	0.00	0.99	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
	pw⊦	0.02	0.00	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00		- 0.00-	0.00		
_	orca-aes-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.49	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.00		
True Label	orca-pres	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.81	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.00		
	mb-aes-	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.66	0.22	0.03	0.02		
	mb-pres	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.08	0.25	0.61	0.02	0.04		
	pico-aes	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.06	0.33	0.38		
	pico-pres	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.12	0.20	0.46		
	Predictions											



## Conclusions

- Remote attacker can upload TDC and collect sensor readings which reflect other user's activity in multi-tenant environment
- Proposed three-stage classification for identifying remote computation
- Ability to classify computation is necessary precursor to existing power distribution and side-channel attacks